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TWENTY-SECOND EDWARD H. YOUNG
LECTURE IN LEGAL EDUCATION:
PROFESSIONALISM:
RESTORING THE FLAME'
COLONEL DONALD

L. BURNETT,

JR.2

I. Introduction
Perhaps I should address you as "senior partners, partners, and associates in one of the world's largest law firms." That description literally
would be true, and it would illustrate my purpose today: to emphasize values held in common by lawyers in military service and members of the
general legal profession. It is appropriate to underscore common values
here at The Judge Advocate General's (JAG) School. This is a schoolhouse connected to the world; people come from the field, teach and learn,
and return to the field. The JAG School is a place where we reaffirm fundamental values such as ethical conduct, principled decision-making, and
personal selflessness (recognizing that life has a meaning larger than our
own pains and pleasures).

I. This article is an edited transcript of a lecture delivered on 26 February 1998 by
then-Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Bumett, Jr. to members of the staff and faculty, distinguished guests, and officers attending the 46th Graduate Course at The Judge Advocate
General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. The lecture is named in honor of Colonel
Edward H. (Ham) Young, who served two tours as the Commandant of The Judge Advocate
General's School. He was the first Commandant of the School when it was established in
Washington D.C. in 1942. He presided over the School for two years and oversaw its expansion and transfer to the University of Michigan. He returned as Commandant when The
School was reactivated at Fort Meyer in 1950. His distinguished military career began when
he received his commission in 1918 from West Point and served with the American Expeditionary Force and the Army of Occupation in Europe after World War I. His impressive legal
career in the Army also included assignments as an Assistant Professor of Law at the United
States Military Academy, the China Theatre Judge Advocate and legal advisor to the Far East
United Nations War Crimes Commission, the Chief of the War Crimes Branch in the Office
of the Judge Advocate General, and service on the First Judicial Council and Board of Review
at The Office of The Judge Advocate General. Colonel Young ended his career in the Army
in 1954 while serving as Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, Second Army.
2. Reserve Deputy Commandant, The Judge Advocate General's School, and Dean,
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville. A.B. magna cum laude, Harvard University; J.D., University of Chicago; LL.M., University of Virginia. Former president, Idaho State Bar, and judge, Idaho Court of Appeals.
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Values are embedded in a culture of professionalism, sustained by this
school. Visionary leaders helped build the culture, as we are reminded by
the name of this room-the Decker Auditorium. Colonel Decker, then
working with the Special Projects Division of the Office of The Judge
Advocate General, oversaw the creation of the first permanent installation
for the JAG School at the University of Virginia. Colonel "Ham" Young,
for whom today's lecture is named, provided the spirit, spark, and programmatic concept for the JAG School itself. Their vision has given us a
place with a purpose.
In my civilian occupation, I work at another place where a visionary
figure gave the school its purpose, the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
Justice Brandeis, whose remains are buried at our school, provided a tangible legacy in the form of 250,000 of his books and papers, and helped us
obtain the papers of Justice John Marshall Harlan. He directed that we
receive original Supreme Court briefs (a tradition still honored by the
Court today), and he even reached into his own pocket to buy light fixtures
for our law school during the Depression.
The most enduring part of his legacy, however, has been intangible.
He had a vision of an academic institution expressing the community at its
'3
best. "The aim must be high," he declared, "and the vision broad."
Today, we in legal education serve a public disaffected with lawyers,
and a legal profession, especially on the civilian side, appearing to drift
away from high aims and broad visions. I propose to talk about these problems, and the challenge of reclaiming our common values, as a collective
responsibility of the academy and the profession. My remarks begin with
the early role-what should be the enduring role-of the lawyer as a community leader and as a link connecting persons and groups within a community. Then I will comment on the evolution of legal education, contrasting
the Langdell model, which analogizes law to science, with the Brandeis
model, which connects law to public service. I will discuss the importance
of rekindling our profession's historic values that resonate with the service
mission of the academy. Finally, I will ask you to think of how all of us as
lawyers and educators-now in uniform, perhaps in civilian attire during a
second career-can improve the profession while responding constructively
3.
Letter from Justice Louis D. Brandeis, to Alfred Brandeis, his brother, Alfred
Brandeis (1925) (on file in the Brandeis Collection, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville).
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to unfair attacks upon it. In short, I will challenge you to help restore the
flame of professionalism.

H. Our Historical Legacy: Lawyers2 Clients and Communities
Aristotle observed that three great professions-priests, doctors,
and lawyers (or "lawgivers")-confront common ethical questions
from different perspectives.4 Priests answer to a divine power and doctors answer to science, but lawyers answer to society. As servants of the
public, we lawyers may have the most difficult of professions, for society
can be an arbitrary and ungrateful taskmaster. Moreover, unlike a divine
power that can fulfill faith, and unlike a body of scientific knowledge that
can verify a medical opinion, society cannot validate the lawyer's work by
achieving perfect, harmonious justice. Rather, justice is an endless pursuit
and, in a free society, the subject of an ongoing debate.
Nonetheless, the pursuit of justice is ennobling. During the early history of the United States, the role of the lawyer was understood to be that
of seekingjustice. The lawyer provided a voice for community values and,
by serving many clients of different backgroundsfurnished a dynamic of
inclusiveness within the community. Of course, inclusiveness then did not
mean what it does now-it certainly did not include people of color or, in
most circumstances, women-but to the extent there was inclusion at all, a
lawyer's work generated and protected it. Thus, de Toqueville wrote that
although the United States had no ancestral, landed aristocracy, it did have
a democratic aristocracy in the practicing Bar.' He praised the service of
lawyers in holding their communities together.
Even in the first half of the twentieth century, a lawyer was known primarily for service. Sol Linowitz, who wrote a mournful critique of today's
legal profession, recalls:
When I entered the profession fifty-six years ago, a lawyer was
a member of an esteemed and honored profession. Becoming a
lawyer meant joining a helping profession-one [that] dealt with
the problems of people and did so sensitively and effectively.
4.

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE (Newman, ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1887).

5.

ALExis DE TocQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA (Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (12th ed.

1848).
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Lawyers regarded themselves as charged with public trust-committed to strengthening our systems of law and justice ....
I knew the fulfillment of having men and women who entered
my office in panic and distress leave it grateful and with peace of
mind, and I came to understand that human relations is the stuff
of which law is made; that no lawyer worth his salt can practice
his calling impersonally; that to be a lawyer in the deepest sense
of the word is to concern oneself with people and the things
which bring people together; and that being a real lawyer
involves knowing how to work with those you must serve. The
6
law was for me truly a human profession.
There is a close nexus between Linowitz's remembrance of a "human
profession" and de Tocqueville's description of lawyers serving communities. Each sees something noble in helping real people in real situations,
accepting their human imperfections and serving them in response to a
higher calling.
As judge advocate officers-members of an organization older than
the United States itself-we have a special appreciation for lawyers whose
service has helped shape the nation's history. Consider these images of
American lawyers, past and present:
Think of a Philadelphian in New York, the first Philadelphia lawyer who undertook the defense of John Peter Zenger, protecting
his right to publish what he chose free from censorship or interference. His name was Alexander Hamilton and he was a lawyer.
You would see another at the trial of Captain Preston, the trial
that arose out of the Boston Massacre. His name was John
Adams. He would become the second President of the United
States. He was a lawyer.
You would see him at the Miracle at Philadelphia, the Constitutional Convention of 1787, fighting for a statement of rights that
6. Sol Linowitz, Respect for Lawyers,Respect for Law, 54 BEqcH & B. OF MIN. No.
10, 27-28 (Nov. 1997). See SOL LrNowirz (with Martin Meyer), THE BERAYED PROFESSION
(1994).
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eventually became the basis of American freedom. His name
was James Madison. He was a lawyer.
You would see him at Gettysburg, tears in his eyes, gaunt and
morose, rededicating our country to principles of equal justice
for all. He said, "As I would not be a slave, so I would also not
be a master." His name was Abraham Lincoln and he was a lawyer.
You would see him, an elemental man, fighting for one cause or
another and in Dayton, Tennessee, preaching the legitimacy of
evolution. His name was Clarence Darrow. He was a lawyer.
You would see him speaking to us from a wheel chair, lifting our
spirits, making us stronger with his inspirational philosophy:
"The only thing we have to fear, is fear itself." His name was
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was a lawyer.
You would see her standing before the podium of the United
States Supreme Court and insisting that her client, Gerald Gault,
a fifteen year old juvenile, had a right to due process - a radical
proposition at the time. Her name was Amelia Lewis and she
was a lawyer.
You would also see her in the U.S. House of Representatives in
July, 1974, during the most serious constitutional crisis of this
century. She gave voice to our fear, our anguish, our hope. She
showed us the way. Her name was Barbara Jordan. She was a
7
lawyer.
In this glimpse of history, we find a noble heritage of lawyers serving
as the connective tissue in a society torn by divisive forces. That heritage
has special meaning today. John Sexton, dean of the New York University
School of Law, and immediate past president of the Association of American Law Schools, has observed:
From the beginning, America has been a society based on law
and forged by lawyers. For Americans, the law has been the
great arbiter, the principal means by which we have been able to
7. John G. Prather, Jr., President' Page,Ky. BmEcH & B. 2-3 (Summer 1993). These
excerpts paraphrase portions of an oft-quoted speech on the American lawyer.
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knit one nation out of a people whose principal characteristic
always has been diversity. And, just as the law has been a principal means for founding, defining, preserving, reforming, and
democratizing, a united America, America's lawyers have been
charged with setting the nation's values-a charge that runs not
only to "great cases" and major reform movements, but also to
the lawyer's day to day dealing with clients. In our society, lawyers are and must be the conscience of both the legal system and
8
the client-for if they are not, no one will be.
As Dean Sexton implies, nobility in the legal profession is not limited
to a high-profile public practice. The simple, quiet, competent service rendered to individuals is noble, too. Indeed, the reflective practitioner is the
true hero of our profession today-a lawyer who understands that our professional responsibilities are threefold. First, of course, the lawyer is a representative of clients. This is the role of the lawyer as an attorney.
Although anyone can be an attorney in a contractual sense-an agent for
someone else-only lawyers are trained to be attorneys in the full professional sense, exercising an informed and independent judgment. Second,
lawyers-unlike contractual "attomeys"-are officers of the courts and legal
system. Third, lawyers are public citizens having a special responsibility
for the quality of justice. All these roles are recognized, as you know, in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 9
Because lawyers are expected to perform every role, they cannot be
mere contractual "attorneys" or narrow technicians of a legal craft. They
should view each client's interests in the broader context of justice, pursued with independent professional judgment, with obedience of duties
owed to the courts and legal system, and with awareness of the leadership
obligations of lawyers as public citizens. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis,
lawyers must have an aim high and a vision broad.

II. Science and Service: Two Models of Legal Education
Regrettably, most young lawyers learn little in law school that raises
their aim or broadens their vision. Although modem legal education is a
8.
John Sexton, The Presidents Message: Restoring the Notion that Lawyers are
Society's Conscience, 97-2 THE NEWSL. (Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, April 1997).
9. American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,"Preamble: A
Lawyer's Responsibility" (adopted 1983).

19981

22ND ED WARD H. YOUNG LECTURE

trilogy of doctrine, skills, and values, most students find the primary
emphasis to be on doctrine, with a secondary focus on skills and scant
attention paid to values beyond a mandatory single course in professional
responsibility.
Legal doctrine has been at the top of the educational agenda since the
days of Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard. Langdell's approach
to law teaching in the late nineteenth century was a brilliant adaptation of
the scientific method, which had produced an explosion of new knowledge
and, through applications of technology during the Industrial Revolution,
had generated extraordinary new wealth in the Western world. Langdell
advocated enabling students to learn law the way scientists learn about the
natural world. Scientists observe phenomena, develop hypotheses to
explain what they have observed, and validate their hypotheses by repeating the observations or by replicating the phenomena under controlled conditions. If they observe new phenomena, they either adjust their
hypotheses or create new ones. Through this repetitive process of observation and hypothesis, scientists discover the natural order.
Langdell believed students could learn the law in a similar way. Students would investigate the sources of law-consisting, at that time, mainly
of judge-made common law-by reading cases. They would develop
hypotheses to explain these legal phenomena and validate their hypotheses
against other cases. These validated hypotheses would express the underlying rules of law, actively discovered in the classroom rather than passively absorbed in lectures. A sage professor would guide the students in
this process, employing a questioning technique to facilitate the discoveries. Hence, the Socratic method that we have employed in legal education
for a century.
Although the Langdell model has served us well, we hav6 come to
recognize its limits. The method teaches doctrine; it does not address
skills, nor is it well suited to inculcating values. Even with respect to doctrine, it works less well in a world of statutes and regulations than in the
common law world where it was born. It also creates a false economy of
teaching resources because it can be employed with large audiences of students, unlike the clinical model of medical education developed by Dr.
Abraham Flexner of Louisville.l 0 Flexner gave to medicine what Langdell
omitted from law-an educational process employing a high ratio of faculty
10. John J. Costonis, The MacCrateReport: OfLoaves, Fishes, and the Future of
American Legal Education,43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993).

MILITARYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 158

to students, developing skills in small working groups, and inculcating
professional values through mentoring relationships. Langdell's model
also lacked insight into the social, economic, or political processes that
shape law-or into the role of lawyers as participants in those processes.
These insights came in the twentieth century from another Louisvillian: Louis D. Brandeis. Although Justice Brandeis is rightly lionized for
his profoundly influential service on the Supreme Court, he had fashioned
an historic career as a lawyer before President Woodrow Wilson appointed
him. While maintaining an active practice, he lectured at Harvard, wrote
such landmark pieces as The Right to Privacy"I and Other People '
Money,12 became one of the Bar's first international figures, and stirred the
idealism of our profession by serving as one of America's first pro bono
lawyers (devoting roughly a day per week to clients and causes that could
provide him no compensation).
Justice Brandeis' experiences as a lawyer helped shape his views
about legal education. Although he saw a continued role for Langdell's
approach, he envisioned a new educational model, anchored in four ideas
that took the study of law beyond a Socratic classroom dialogue and connected it with the outside world. 13 First, Justice Brandeis drew upon his
own pro bono experience to argue that lawyers should be imbued with a
sense of public responsibility-not necessarily to become career public servants, but to become practitioners who would donate some time to worthy
clients and causes without expectation of payment. The power of this idea
is evidenced in the growing number of law schools, including the Brandeis
School itself, that have mandatory public service programs. Students in
these programs learn that giving something back to a community is as
much a part of being a lawyer as drafting a contract or delivering an oral
argument.
Second, Brandeis believed that the law was not quite what Langdell
thought it was-an immutable set of principles to be discovered in the way
a scientist discovers the natural order by observing phenomena in the field.
Figuratively speaking, Langdell might hold up a crystal and say, "Look at
this from different perspectives, experiment with it, discover its structure.
This is the law." Brandeis, however, would say the law is not inert like a
11. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv.
193 (1880).
12. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914).
13. "The Brandeis Legacy," Catalogue of the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville (1996-1998).
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crystal, but is dynamic like a biological entity responding to its environment. In order to understand the law-to find the wellsprings of both its
wisdom and its foolishness-the lawyer needs to be, in effect, a Renaissance person, journeying across disciplines into economics, sociology, and
other fields. Brandeis put this idea to practice in his own career as a lawyer, pioneering the citation of non-legal authorities to support legal arguments in what we now call his famous "Brandeis Briefs." Today, at law
schools engaged in interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, students
learn that broad-based learning increases a lawyer's capacity to understand
a client's problems. It also enhances the lawyer's ability to serve the client
by rendering an informed opinion about the future direction of the law.
Third, Brandeis thought law schools should be small in scale. This
idea was an outgrowth of his general philosophy on the scale of any human
enterprise. He thought that innovation and efficiency usually were. stifled
by large, centralized organizations. 14 He valued small-scale collegiality
and collaboration. I think an institution like the JAG School would have
impressed him, where the faculty-student ratio is relatively high, where
students learn much from each other as well as from a highly accessible
faculty, and where members of the faculty share the students' paths of professional development.
Fourth and finally, Brandeis urged law schools and universities to
advance ideas for improvement in public policy. In this respect, Brandeis
presaged the role of the lawyer as a public citizen, and he saw an opportunity for law schools to contribute to the dynamism of our federal system.
Expressing a view closely akin to his fondness for creativity in small-scale
organizations, Brandeis wrote: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."'1 5 Brandeis thought that law schools and
universities throughout the country could be the engines for such new
ideas, that the states could experiment with them, and that the nation could
emulate the most successful experiments. In advocating this connection
between education and public policy formation, Brandeis placed a special
responsibility upon law schools, not merely to teach the law, but to help
make it better.

14. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934).
15. New State Ice Co. v. Leibman, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Taken together, these elements of the Brandeis model of legal education-public service, interdisciplinary study, collegial learning, and policy
formation-have provided a framework for developing law students into
public-spirited lawyers, aware of their responsibilities to our profession
and of our profession's responsibility to society. The model implicitly
moves law schools toward teaching values, without imposing any narrow
orthodoxy of values. It gives the modem legal academy a service mission
and a stake in professionalism.

III. Reclaiming Our Legacy: High Aspirations and the Lowest Common
Denominator
The profession envisioned by Brandeis, and exemplified by his work,
has no place for those who today are the strip miners of our heritage. These
are the lawyers who stretch rules and ignore ethics, promote themselves
while pretending to serve clients, try cases in the media while claiming to
be courtroom lawyers, and engage in tasteless or predatory marketing of
legal services-asserting, sometimes correctly, a First Amendment right to
do so, but forgetting that professionalism means choosing a course of conduct higher than the minimum allowances of the law.
The strip miners also forget (or do not care) that all members of our
profession, civilian and military lawyers alike, are bound together by a collective reputation. In a profession, unlike a business, one's reputation
depends significantly on everyone else's conduct. In contrast, reputations
in the world of commerce usually are specific to the individual or entity;
indeed, damage to one firm's reputation actually may benefit another.
Thus, if Chevrolet builds a defective car, Ford or Toyota products may
become more popular; or if America On-Line goes off line, Prodigy or
CompuServe may increase their market share. But in our profession, if any
lawyer displays incompetence or engages in misconduct, then all lawyers
are tainted. When such an incident is publicized, the media is likely to feature the story as one of wrongdoing by "a lawyer"-the individual's name
will be secondary.
Perhaps we should take comfort that the media and the public still
consider lawyer wrongdoing uncommon enough to be newsworthy. The
fact remains, however, that when we look at ourselves in the media mirror,
the reflection is not of our noble heritage, nor of our highest aspirations,
but of the lowest common denominator in our profession. Today, as I
speak, the least caring and least competent members of our profession are
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making your reputation and mine. We may extol the best among us, but
we are held hostage by the worst. This unfortunate dichotomy is one reason why society dislikes lawyers generally, even though clients usually
respect their own lawyer.
Our task as a profession-including the legal academy-is to raise the
lowest common denominator and to reinforce the highest aspirations that
bind us together. This does not mean that we should engage in a contrived
public relations campaign. Our task is to earn respect, not merely to claim
it. Moreover, popularity for its own sake is a false goal. As Emile Fourget,
the French essayist, once wrote: "The law should be loved a little because
it is felt to be just, feared a little because it is severe, hated a little because
it is always to a certain degree out of sympathy with the prevalent temper
16
of the day, yet respected because it is felt to be a necessity."'
The true goal is to build, or to re-build, a culture of professionalism
that legitimates this "necessity" of law. Within that culture, the lawyer pursues "a learned art in the spirit of public service."' 17 Building upon this definition, Jerome Shestack, president of the American Bar Association, has
enumerated the elements of professionalism:
First is fidelity to ethics and integrity as a meaningful commitment ....
Second is service with competence and dedication-but with
independence ....
Third is meaningful legal education-not as a chore to meet some
point system but as a means for growth and replenishment ....
Fourth is civility and respect for authority. Let us resist the
Rambo-type tactics in which civility is mocked and ruckus is
routine. Civility is more than surface politeness; it is an
approach that seeks to diminish rancor, to reconcile, to be open
to non-litigious resolution. It modifies the antagonisms and
aggressiveness of an adversarial society...

16. ELBERT HUBBARD, ELBERT HUBBARD'S SCRAPBOOK 38 (1923).
17. Roscoe Pound, quoted in Jerome Shestack, President' Message: Defining Our
Calling, 83 A.B.A. J. 8 (Sept. 1997).
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Fifth is a commitment to improve the justice system and advance
the rule of law. The justice system is our trust and our ministry.
And we bear the brunt of public dissatisfaction with the justice
system's flaws and deficiencies .... To make that limping legal
structure stride upright is the obligation of every lawyer.

The final element of legal professionalism is pro bono service..
.. Much has been given to our profession; it seems right to give
something back-indeed, it is an ethical obligation .... 18
Unfortunately, most members of the general public doubt that we
really stand for these things. They hear about lawyers whose words and
actions impugn professionalism. Within the legal community, we even
hear some lawyers attack professionalism as political correctness or a
threat to freedom. Needless to say, the First Amendment, which we all
cherish, protects the expressive rights of those who disavow professional
duty while trading on professional privilege. But the rest of us have First
Amendment rights, too. We can and should speak up when someone in our
profession's lowest common denominator brings core values into disrepute.
One voluntary association doing so is the Federal Bar Association
(FBA), which recently adopted standards of civility. Lawyers who do not
behave civilly are no longer welcome in that organization. In words that
military lawyers can appreciate, FBA president Robert Mueller recently
made this observation:
Make no mistake. If the profession truly is to shed its image of
excess in the adversary process, it is nothing less than an entire
subculture that will have to get that message. Too many among
us not only do not conduct themselves civilly but do not want to
do so. They wear their discourtesies and their offensiveness in
tone and tactics the way warriors wear their campaign ribbons.
While the latter reflect honor and courage, the former do not.19

18. Shestack, supra note 17.
19. Robert L. Mueller, President'sMessage: Standardsof Civility-A Lesson in Good
Manners, THE FED. LAw. 2-3 (Jan. 1998).

1998]

22ND ED WARD H. YOUNG LECTURE

We in legal education should support the profession's effort to reclaim
its heritage. The American Bar Association's Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (sometimes called the "MacCrate
Commission") has made a number of recommendations on which law
schools are now working. The Commission has urged law school deans,
professors, administrators, and staff "to convey to students... the need to
promote justice, fairness, and morality... ."20 The Commission envisions
professional development occurring throughout an educational continuum
that begins in law school (or perhaps even earlier) and extends over an
entire career. Professionalism is viewed as a life's work.
At the front end of this educational continuum, law schools are ill situated to produce professionalism for life; but we can provide a "values
inoculation" against the diseases of rule-skirting behavior and purely market-driven practice. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with a lawyer providing services in a market that rewards high standards of performance;
but the lawyer also must exhibit high standards of conduct, even though
the market may not require or reward them. If we give students such a
"values inoculation," the profession-throughout its broad part of the educational continuum-must provide periodic "booster shots" by vigorously
disciplining those who engage in misconduct and by speaking out, as individuals or through voluntary associations, whenever our lowest common
denominator demeans us.
Because we are a profession, not a mercantile occupation, we should
not shrink from espousing values, so long as we focus on foundational elements of professionalism-as Shestack has done-and do not become selfrighteous or attempt to prescribe wholly private conduct. We also need to
back up what we say with what we do. We are being watched. Our actions
convey our values to students, to each other, and to members of the general
public-who logically believe our profession is entitled to no greater
respect than we ourselves show it.
Although professional responsibility is taught in every accredited law
school, the real lessons in professionalism are taught every day in courtrooms, conference rooms, lawyers' offices, even on the telephone.
Whether we are professors, judges or practitioners, all of us are teachers;
we simply provide instruction in different venues. Together, we should
20. American Bar Association, Task Force on Legal Education and the Profession:
Narrowingthe Gap, LEGAL EDUC. & PROF. DEv.: AN EDUC. CONTINUUM 333 (1992).
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strive toward education in the sense described a century ago by John
Ruskin:
Education does not mean merely teaching people what they do
not know. It means teaching them to behave as they do not
behave. It is a painful, continual and difficult work to be done
by kindness, by watching, by warning, by precept, by praise, but
2
above all by example. '
Accepting responsibility for setting an example means that we cannot
disregard the values expressed in the jobs we are trained, and that we train
others, to do. Unfortunately, as a profession, we may have diminished our
own perception of values when we made a transition from the aspirational
Canons of Ethics to the partly aspirational and partly prescriptive Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, more recently, to the entirely prescriptive
Rules of Professional Conduct. To young lawyers who lack their own
moral compass, reducing ethics to a set of presecriptive rules may send a
message that professional responsibility consists simply of knowing what
you can, and cannot, get away with.
Here is an example. Last year, the Arizona Republic, a newspaper in
Phoenix, carried a criminal defense lawyer's advertisement enumerating
mistakes that cause some drug dealers to get caught. An ensuing controversy caused the newspaper's business office to terminate the advertisement. A newspaper columnist, however, contacted the lawyer and later
reported the following colloquy:
"Your ad tells bad guys how to avoid getting caught," I said.
"I'm exercising freedom of speech. I'm not telling anyone how
not to get caught. I'm telling how some people get caught."
"Same thing, isn't it?"
"No, it's different. I can't advise people how not to get caught.
Lawyers can't be doing that."
"Think your ad might bother people?"
22
"I don't care. They don't have to do business with me."

21.

HUBBARD,

supra note 16, at 17.
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In that exchange, we see a lawyer invoking the First Amendment and
disavowing any professional obligation to operate above the minimum
level of legal protection. We also see a failure to distinguish between a
profession and a business, with an accompanying disregard for the collective reputation of all lawyers. Indeed the newspaper columnist concluded
his story with the observation, "Attorneys can advertise all they want. If
they sound more like used-car salesmen than legal professionals, fine by
me ....[They] have enough problems with public approval these days.
They don't need to take out ads to create more. ' 23 This is the lowest common denominator at work.
We cannot raise the bottom of the profession by rules alone. Legal
educators, lawyers, and judges, joined in common cause, must teach and
display the virtues that characterized the ideal lawyer a century ago.
Anthony Kronman, dean of Yale Law School, described this ideal lawyer
in his book, The Lost Lawyer, as "a devoted citizen[, one who] cares about
the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being for it,
24
unlike those who use the law merely to advance their private ends."
Elsewhere, Dean Kronman has warned:
If the legal profession is to retain its moral stature (the only thing
that can justify the influence lawyers possess), everyone in itlawyers, judges, and legal educators-must now act to recapture
the ideals of citizenship and public service that have been the
25
pride of the profession in the past.
If we heed this warning-if we teach values in all venues where professional behavior is shaped-we can reclaim a heritage that was noble
once, and could become so again.

IV. The Other Side of Professionalism: Answering Unfair Attacks
If we have a high calling to recapture the historic ideals of our profession, we also have a daunting task in combating the cynicism of the late
twentieth century. The corrosive effects of this cynicism are evident in
22. Steve Wilson, Lawyer Ad May Hit a New Low, Aruz. REPUBLIC, reprintedin LouISVILLE COURIER-J., Oct. 24, 1997, at B-3.

23. Id.
24. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
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25. Anthony T. Kronman, Letter to the Editor,WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 1995).
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today's lawyer-bashing, a national sport that has dispirited many of our
most idealistic lawyers and, I fear, is now deterring many idealistic young
people from considering careers in law. The sheer meanness of our times
is apparent in a modem cultural icon-the lawyer joke.
I do not wish to make too much of a seemingly narrow subject, but I
must disclose that I am no longer as tolerant of lawyer jokes as I once was.
Like many lawyers, I used to laugh at such jokes, even re-telling them, as
a way of getting along, showing a lack of pretense or undue sensitivity, and
mollifying people who harbored bad feelings (sometimes justifiably)
toward our profession. But now I have come to view the casual cruelty of
lawyer jokes as a means by which negative stereotypes are perpetuated and
positive aspirations are discredited.
Today, if I hear the beginning of a familiar lawyer joke, I may inteject
something like, "Sorry, I've heard this one, so I already know the punchline. It's a joke that hurts the best people in my profession and makes no
difference to the worst." The response, after an awkward moment, usually
is a disclaimer against wanting to hurt anybody-sometimes followed by an
apology or by a reminder that "it's just a joke." Of course, not every situation calls for being a killjoy, and you may not feel comfortable playing
that role. But I urge you to ponder what we convey about our high calling
whenever we nod and laugh appreciatively at a story that mocks the values
26
of our profession or denigrates the humanity of lawyers as a group.
Misinformation also buffets our profession, much of it reflecting what
I call the "little truth/big truth" dichotomy. Permit me to go outside the
legal profession, for a moment, to illustrate this dichotomy with a story. A
rural county sheriff was besieged with negative stories in the local newspaper; anything that went wrong in his office, any allegation of wrongdo26. In my presentation of the Young Lecture, I distinguished between stories that
attack lawyers' values and those that merely poke fun at individual foibles. As an example
of the latter, I recalled a purportedly true (although probably apocryphal) account of a deposition in which a lawyer asked a medical examiner whether the patient was dead when the
autopsy was performed. When the doctor said "yes," the lawyer asked how he could be
sure. "Because," the doctor replied, "the patient's brain was in ajar on my desk." When
the lawyer, persisting, asked if it was possible that the patient was alive nonetheless, the
exasperated doctor reportedly said, "Well, yes, I suppose he could have been practicing law
somewhere." I characterized this story as funny because it was so extraordinarily silly, and
suggested that any objection to it would be sanctimonious. After the lecture, however, an
earnest young judge advocate officer told me he felt the story was hard to distinguish from
many offensive lawyer jokes he had heard. His observation shows how thin the line is
between humor that entertains and humor that denigrates.
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ing, was reported on the front page. Meanwhile, good works performed by
the sheriff's employees went largely unreported. When the sheriff complained about the coverage, the newspaper editorreplied simply, "Have we
written anything that is not true?" Some time later, the editor decided to
visit a South American country that required, as a condition for issuing a
visa, a letter of good character from a law-enforcement official. The sheriff duly obliged, writing that the editor "is a citizen of this community and,
so far as our records show, has never been convicted of a felony or crime
of moral turpitude. However, our files are very incomplete." The sheriff
sent a copy to the editor, with a hand-written note at the bottom: "All of
this is true, too."
As the story suggests, a little truth is an assertion that seems plausible
when viewed in a narrow context, but which is revealed to be inaccurate or
misleading when all relevant information is considered. A big truth withstands the broader inquiry. Many lawyers, in the role of advocates, are
tempted to use little truths; but they are (or should be) restrained by their
duty of candor as officers of the courts and legal system, and by their obligation of leadership as public citizens. Thus, it was disheartening several
years ago when a national political figure, a lawyer, asked, "Does America
really need seventy percent of the world's lawyers?" The question fueled
a public outcry about "too many lawyers." The little truth was that if all
lawyers in the world are measured by American legal educational standards, then we do indeed have approximately seventy percent of the
world's "lawyers." But the big truth was that if legal service providers are
counted according to the legal education standards of their own countries,
then-according to a study by a business law professor at Washington State
University-the United States actually ranks about thirty-fifth among the
27
nations of the world in "lawyers" per capita.
Another commonly expressed little truth is that the legal profession is
a burden to the economy because lawyers are all litigators or "deal breakers." It is true, of course, that litigation resolves many disputes in our society, and that some contemplated business transactions founder upon
problems that a lawyer has raised. But the big truth is that, to an increasing
extent, litigation these days follows concerted efforts to resolve disputes
by negotiation, mediation, or other alternative means. Moreover, the lawyer who "breaks a deal" by saying "no" or by asking hard questions is serving society, and probably is protecting the parties' long-term interests as
well.
27. Ray August, The Mythical Kingdom ofLawyers, 78 A.B.A.J. 72 (Sept. 1992).
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In addition, the little truth about "deal breakers" ignores a big truth
about the broad and constructive role that modem lawyers play in legitimate business transactions. I was reminded of this growing role two years
ago when I was part of a University delegation visiting Pacific Rim countries. One of our delegates asked a businessman in South Korea what kind
of higher education was most needed to promote economic development,
and his answer was "law." My colleagues were stunned; they never had
thought of "litigators" as the enablers and organizers of transactions, or as
the community leaders who could marshal resources necessary for investing in economic development. Limited experience and little truths had
cramped how they perceived lawyering.
Some little truths, of course, are hardly truths at all. I acknowledged
a moment ago that we may rely too much on litigation as a way to resolve
disputes in this country. But popular rhetoric about a "litigation explosion"
has greatly exaggerated the problem in the public mind. For example, if
asked how many tort jury trials are held in the nation's state courts every
year, people are likely to imagine such trials occurring in thousands of
courtrooms across the country every week-hundreds of thousands of trials
in a year. But the answer is fewer than 25,000 per year in all the state
courts. 28 Or, if asked how often plaintiffs receive jury awards in tort cases,
including medical malpractice claims, people are likely to surmise that
plaintiffs usually get something. But the truth is that just under half receive
anything, and the fraction is less than one-third in medical malpractice
cases. 29 If asked to estimate the median damage award in those tort cases
where juries actually do find for plaintiffs, people are likely to envision lottery-level figures because those are the outcomes reported in the media.
The truth, though, is that the median award is about $51,000.30 Providing
the public this kind of factual information and debunking harmful mythswhether in a conversation at a coffee shop or in a speech to a local service
club-is part of a lawyer's function as a public citizen. It is part of our professionalism.
Finally, I invite you, as officers of the courts and legal system, to consider the harm done by public misperceptions about the role of the judiciary in a democratic society. Lay-people do not grasp intuitively the
concept that one of our three branches of government should implement
28. Brian Ostrom et. al, A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the
1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (Mar.-Apr. 1996).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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the rule of law, even when unpopular, rather than following the majority
impulse. Many citizens grow angry when judges do not follow the "will
of the people." Yet that, precisely, is what our Constitution demands.
The signing of the Constitution in Philadelphia represented a turning
point in history. Government then ceased to be merely the product of raw
political will and became instead a force controlled by a written charter. If
the idea of a charter was unique, the document itself was truly remarkable.
Our Constitution dispersed authority among three branches of government
and provided that the third branch, the judiciary, would be profoundly different from the other two. Unlike Congress, which would consist of representatives elected by the people and of senators elected (in those days)
by state legislatures, and unlike the President, who would be chosen by the
Electoral College reflecting the vote of the people, the judiciary would be
insulated from elective politics. Federal judges, appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, would serve for life or good
behavior. The judiciary would be independent-a branch of government
beholden to no special interest and charged simply, but inspiringly, to
uphold the laws and the Constitution of the United States.
This idea of an independent judiciary, responsible for upholding the
rule of law and for protecting constitutional rights, even when disfavored
by the politics of the moment, is one of America's most fundamental contributions to the cause of liberty. It is still an idea in need of nurturing.
Wherever we see power abused elsewhere in the world-whether in the
suppression of dissident views in China, or in the jailing of journalists in
Turkey-we see judicial systems succumbing to political control. Indeed,
reflecting on our own nation's history, one might wonder when, if ever, a
politicized Supreme Court would have held that the Constitution forbids
racial segregation, that every person's vote is entitled to equal weight, or
that every person charged with a serious crime has a right to counsel.
This does not mean that judicial independence should translate into
lack of accountability. Federal judges can be impeached, or they can be
disciplined within the judicial branch. State systems also have mechanisms to remove judges for cause, such as incapacity or conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that brings judicial office into disrepute.
These are important but narrowly tailored forms of accountability. Many
states have gone beyond accountability, however, and have created elective systems in which judges must compete for the voters' favor, in much
the same manner as candidates seeking office in the other two branches of
government. Sometimes the judicial candidates run as Republicans or
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Democrats, sometimes there are no party labels; but the bottom line for all
of them is that they must engage in elective politics. Even if they receive
an initial appointment to judicial office, they must think immediately about
waging a campaign at the upcoming election, strategically situating themselves in the voters' minds for approval at the ballot box, and finding a way
to raise money for a contested campaign. Unfortunately, such judicial
electioneering undermines judicial independence, both in fact and in public perception, thereby eroding the capacity of our third branch of government to protect the rule of law and to uphold constitutional rights when the
political tide is flowing against them.
My object here is not to lobby you about appointive or elective systems, or about the impact of campaign finance upon judicial independence
and integrity-although I hope you will think about those issues. Rather, it
is to remind you that we as lawyers, possessing a special understanding of
the judicial function, have a duty to defend judges-especially those facing
elections-who make courageous and legally principled, but unpopular,
decisions. We can educate the public about that great American innovation-the independent judiciary-and in so doing, we can reaffirm the values
of the legal profession itself. They are woven from the same fabric.

V. Conclusion
Washington Irving told us that "great minds have purposes, others have wishes."3 1 The essence of professionalism is to dedicate oneself
to a purpose higher than any personal wishes. What, then, is your purpose?
Is it to be a contractual "attorney?" Is it, instead, to be a lawyer who pursues justice while exercising independent judgment, honoring duties to the
courts and legal system, and earning respect as a public citizen? Is it to
become a teacher in every professional venue, demonstrating by word and
example your dedication to ethics above minimal rules and marketplace
rewards? Is it to raise our profession's lowest common denominator and
to defend the profession against unfair attack? These questions demand
answers that will give genuine meaning to your career now and, perhaps,
to a second career later. The answers must come from you, from your values-inspired, we hope, by a lifetime of legal education, but sustained ultimately by your character and your sense of justice.

31.
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George Eliot, the nineteenth century novelist and essayist, once
asked, "Who shall put his finger on the work of justice and say it is there?"
Then, answering her own question, she observed, "Justice is like the kingdom of God. It is not without us as a fact; it is within us as a great yearning."' 32 In that spirit, I beckon you to join the lawyers who love this
country, founded upon legal principle; who are called to a profession, troubled yet restorable; who claim no perfection, but are the keepers of the
flame; and in whom justice, now and forever, resides as a great yearning.

32. HUBBARD, supra note 16, at 14.

